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CHILD NEGLECT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS
MICHAEL F. SULLIVAN*
The author criticizes the vague statutes governing child neglect
trials and the simultaneous delegation of power to the iudiciary
which allows the courts to impose their individual notions of
child care and morality on parents. He suggests an alternative
approach to neglect cases which focuses on the casual relation-
ship between parental behavior and harm to the child and gives
weight to the rights of parents. He concludes that significant
progress is not probable until careful legislation materializes and
the courts supplement it with other professional assistance.
In the exercise of the parens patriae power, every state in the
union has enacted statutes designed to protect neglected children.'
* BA., Yale; J.D., University of Chicago Law School; Associate in the law firm
Bricker, Evat, Barton & Eckler, Columbus, Ohio.
These are sometimes called "dependency" statutes, a term frequently used s a
synonym for "neglect." When a state has statutes defining both terms, the dependency
sections usually deal with nonculpable parental behavior, as when a child is medically
neglected because of the parent's poverty.
The following sections of statutes define the terms "dependent" and "neglected'
child either directly or by setting out the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts:
ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (1962); ARz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 8-201 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-203 (Supp. 1965); CAL. WELFARE
& INSTNS CODE § 600 (West 1966) (jurisdiction); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-1
(1963); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-53 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tie. 10, § 1101
(1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-906 (1961) (jurisdiction); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01
(1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2408 (1959) (jurisdiction); REV. LAWS HAWAII § 333-8
(Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1625 -26 (Supp. 1967) (jurisdiction); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2001 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3206
(1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.2 (Supp. 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-802 (Supp.
1965); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.011 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:1570 (1951);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 22, § 3792 (1964) (jurisdiction); M. ANN. CODE art. 26,
§ 52 (1966); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 24 (1965) (jurisdiction); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 27.3178 (598.2) (1962) (jurisdiction); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (Supp.
1966); MIss. CODE ANN. § 7185-02 (Supp. 1942); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.031 (1962)
(jurisdiction); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 10-501 (1957); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-201
(1960); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040 (1963) (jurisdiction); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169:2 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-2 (1953);
N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 312, N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 371; N.C. GEN. STAT. § §
110-21, 110-39 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-08 (1960) (jurisdiction); OHIO
REV. CODE ANw. §§ 2151.03, .05 (1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 101 (1966);
ORE. REv. STAT, § 419. 476 (1965) (jurisdiction); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243
(1965); 11.. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-3 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § § 15-1103; 15-
1334 (1962); S.D. CODE § 43.0301 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. 37-242 (Supp. 1966);
T-x. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2330 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10.64 (Supp.
1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tie. 33, § 602 (Supp. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158
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Once a court finds that a child comes within the statutory definition
of a "neglected child," its jurisdiction attaches for the duration of
the child's minority and the court has power to issue orders to the
child's parents or to take physical custody of the child temporarily
or until he reaches majority.2 In some states a finding of neglect
may also be a basis for criminal prosecution of the parents or for
a complete termination of parental rights."
In all of these neglect statutes the legislatures, through the
use of extremely broad and vague phraseology in the definitional
sections, have almost completely delegated to the judiciary the
power to determine its jurisdiction over allegedly neglected chil-
dren. Typical provisions define a neglected child as one who has not
"4proper care" or "proper parental care," "whose parent fails to
provide other care necessary for his well being," "whose home is
unfit by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity,"7 "who lacks proper
(1960) (jurisdiction); WAsH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 49-1-3 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.13 (Supp. 1967); and WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-40 (1965).
' See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 351 (1959); AMIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-231
(Supp. 1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-221 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-68
(1960).
' See Levy, Griminal liability for the Punishment of Children: An Evaluation of
Means and Ends, 43 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 719 (1953). See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN,
§-41-1105 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-3 (1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit, 13 § 1303
(1958).
' See Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under IWhich a Child May be Adopted
Without the Consent of His Parent, 39 U. DET. L. J. 347, 361 (1961). See, e.g., CAL,
CIVIL CODE § 323 (b) (Supp. 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-43a (1960).
' There are no explicit requirements as to the cause or effect in Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, MIs
souri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, Utah,
Virginia and Wyoming. In some states, a vague cause for the lack of care must be
shown; for example, 'by reason of the faults or habits of his parents" is the rule in
Alaska, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wisconsin. In other states,
an. effect of the lack of care must be shown, such as endangering the welfare of tie
child or others, or that the child is supported by or is in the custody of a state agency
as the result of the lack of care. (Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, and Kansas.)
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia (welfare, not well
being), Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, MssIs.
sippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
' Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Michi.
gan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.
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attention,"s or who is "neglected." 9 Iowa declares that a child
is neglected "who is living under such other unfit surroundings
as bring such child, in the opinion of the court, within the spirit
of this chapter." Many other states compound ambiguities by
including more than one extremely broad provision in the sta-
tutory definition.
This broad delegation has been applauded because of the
need for flexibility in this area of law and because of the wide
range of consequences a given form of parental misconduct can
have on different children in different environments.' 0 Moreover,
a search of the cases reveals no judicial acceptance of constitutional
challenges on a void-for-vagueness theory." Still, serious problems
are raised if clear standards are not enunciated. Trial judges with
disparate viewpoints may be given license to impose their theories
of child rearing and causation on the community and to imple-
ment these theories with a great freedom of disposition in the
individual case. These problems are accentuated by the lack of
instruction from appellate courts and meager outside assistance.
Only a small proportion of the cases are appealed or otherwise
reach the reports;' 2 in those that do, there is relatively little articu-
lation and supervision of standards which are applied. Furthermore,
in most states neglect cases are tried without a jury,13 a body which
might be responsive to a wider range of norms bearing on child-
rearing than would a single judge.
S Massachusetts.
'North Carolina (neglected being undefined).
See Gill, The Legal Nature of Neglect, 6 N.P.P.A.J. 1, 5-6 (1960).
In Ini re Black, 3 Utah 2d 315, 283 P.2d 887 (1955), the court summarily dis-
missed appellant's contention that the neglect statute was unconstitutional in that it -as
vague and uncertain, saying that there was no merit to this complaint. Id. at 900. But
see the judicial impatience manifested in People v. Chiafreddo, 381 IL 214, 44 NY..2d
888 (1942), a criminal case in which defendant was charged with contributing to the
dependency and neglect of a child. The court held that an indictment charging "failure
to give proper parental care and guardianship" was wholly insufficient because of lack
of specificity. It then refused to judge the propriety of the parental act in question.
" Financially disadvantaged parents are not likely to appeal a lower court decision
because of the cost involved. In a study of neglect referrals in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
area over a two month period, Boehm found that "the preponderance of the families re-
ferred for neglect came from the lower socio-economic strata of the community... :'
While three % of the total population of the area received public assistance, 42% of
the referral families did. Boehm, The Community and the Social Agency Define Neglect,
43 CHILD WELFARE 453 (1964).
Nomikun, Problems of the American Juvenile Court 77, 1964 (unpublished
dissertation on file in the University of Chicago law Library).
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SThis article will discuss some of the problems raised by the
broad delegation, particularly focusing on that less settled and
expanding area of the law of neglect which may be termed "environ-
mental neglect."14 This phrase may be defined as parental15 con.
dition, action or inaction, which adversely affects the child's mind,
morals, or mores. Adjudications in this area are a response to the
policy question of the extent to which the state should control the
psychological environment in which a child matures. A considered
answer to this question is vitally important 0 in a nation which
takes seriously both the strength of the parental relationship and
the welfare of children. For purposes of analysis, five particular
classes of environmental neglect will be discussed separately in
light of a theory proposed in this section dealing with parental
nonconformity. These classes are parental nonconformity, failure
to discipline, excessive discipline and cruelty, parental immorality,
and mentally disturbing parental conduct.
I. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PARENTAL NONCONFORMITY AS NEGLECT
Society has always found it difficult to accommodate itself to
the dissenter, and the religious dissenter particularly evokes strong
feelings. Thus it is not surprising to find that most of the neglect
cases involving parental nonconformity deal with parents who hold
unpopular religious persuasions. In the first part of this century
neglect statutes were not used to "protect" children from religious
ideas which ran counter to the prevailing mores.11 In the last two
decades, however, an increasing intolerance of religious fanaticism
' This type of neglect may be contrasted with the more settled areas such as physi.
cal, medical, educational, and financial neglect in which the state has a strong and justi.
fiable interest and a long history of intervention. There the interest of the state in, having
its future citizens educated and in having them live in reasonably fit physical condi.
tion provides the court with a fairly well-defined objective standard in determining
whether neglect exists.
"' "Parent," as used in connection with neglect theories or statutes shall mean:
parent, guardian or other person in whose care the child may be.
1' In 1950 over a quarter of a million children were in institutions or foster
homes as a result of a finding of neglect or dependency. Simpson, The Ufit Parentz
Conditions Under Which A Child May Be Adopted Without the Consent of His Parent,
39 U. DET. L.J. 347, 392 n. 302 (1961). In 1957 there were over 115,000 dependency
or neglect cases before the court. JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS-1957, U. S. CHILDRBN'S
BUREAU, STATISTICAL SERiES, No. 52 (1959).
" See Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 MI1. 328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913), which held that a
12 year old boy was not dependent and that his mother was not an improper guardian
because she was an ardent member of the Mazdaznan religious society and allowed the
boy to travel with another member who wrote a religious book which "certainly cannot
be commended for perusal by any one:' In re Sisson, 152 Misc. 806, 274 N.Y.S. 857
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has been manifested in neglect law'8 and many findings of neglect
have been predicated on parental action flowing from unpopular
church teaching. This may be brought out by reference to three
fairly recent cases.
In In re Watson'9 three children were declared neglected be-
cause their mother was "incapable by reason of her emotional
status, her mental condition and her allegedly deeply religious (?)
feelings amounting to fanaticism to properly care, provide and look
after these children." 20 The mother in the case was a follower of a
self-anointed prophet claiming Godhood. In performing her relig-
ious obligations, she left the children unsupervised for a portion
of the day, took them to religious banquets nightly from 6:00 to
9:30 p.m. and planned to place them in some sort of communal
living establishment. In finding the children neglected, the court
discussed at length the children's lack of basis for an ability to adjust
"to the conventions and the mores of the community in which they
are to live."'21 It also emphasized the obligation of the parent to
help the child develop into a community-respecting human being.
Hunter v. Powers2 involved a ten year old child whose mother,
an ardent Jehovah's Witness, left the child alone while she attended
(Child Ct. 1934), held that an eight year old girl was not neglected whose father incul-
cated the Megiddo religion, objecting to radio listening and other pleasures, requiring
that all clothing cover limbs, enforcing the study and memorization of religious teats,
and forbidding laughter. The case demonstrates that parentally imposed religious restric-
tions on a child's daily activity was not actionable.
This shortage of patience may be reflected indirectly in the rather strict applica-
tion of educational neglect provisions in statutes to children of religious nonconformists.
The court in In re Currence, 42 Misc. 2d 418, 248 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Fain. Cr. 1963),
found neglected a child who was kept out of school from Wednesday noon to Thursday
noon to observe the sabbath of his parenes sect. See State v. Lefebvre, 91 NIL 382, 20
A.2d 185 (1941), reversing a lower court ruling that three children were neglected who
were suspended from school for failing to salute the flag for religious reasons. Compare
In re Skipwith, 14 Misc. 2d 325, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1958), which held
that a political dissentor's withdrawal of his child from school because of de facto segre-
gation was not unlawful and that the child was not neglected because of the withdrawal.
95 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950).
:0 Id. at 799. The opinion cites no evidence of mental disturbance other than this
religious fanaticism.
Id. at 799.
206 Misc. 784, 135 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Dom. Rel. Cr. 1954). The Hunter Court
seemed little affected by a higher court ruling two years previous, People ex. rel. Portnoy
v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952), held that religious training was
within the parent's sole control and that there could be no finding of neglect based on
the mother's alleged activities in Communist front organizations unless there was a
showing that this in some way made her unfit to rear her six year old child.
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Bible discussions and compelled the child to distribute religious
literature on the streets during parts of the day and night. To the
extent that the court based is findings of neglect on the fact that
the child might have been endangered when alone on the streets,
it used an acceptable standard. However, the court's language in-
dicated that its decision was based also on the belief that the child
should be engaged in some other activity, such as playing or study-
ing, rather than distributing religious literature. This is, of course,
a judicial dictation to the parents of the proper occupations of a
child reinforced by the sanction of a neglect finding, rather than a
finding that a particular occupation encouraged by the parent is
dangerous to the child.23
The final case is In re Black 24 in which eight children were
declared neglected and taken from their home because their par-
ents believed plural marriage to be a law of God and practiced
and taught it. The court grounded its decision on the theory that
the children were living in an immoral environment.
These cases are representative of the recent judicial response
to the legislative delegation of authority to define neglect. Some
characteristics present here and found in most cases dealing with
environmental neglect may be noted. First, these three courts looked
primarily to the actions of the parent and not to the effects these
actions have on the child. No distinction was made between those
parental actions and beliefs which can have little effect on the
child and those which will affect the child detrimentally. At times,
indeed, the finding of neglect seemed aimed at punishing the
parent rather than protecting the child. Second, like most courts,
these three did not attempt to isolate those general circumstances
in which neglect should be found. Nor did they present or
discuss a cohesive theory of neglect responsive to the policy question
of when state intervention into the life of the family is justified.
In the typical case, a court may merely set forth the facts of the
case 25 and conclude that these facts present a situation of "neglect."
Commentators on the law of neglect also appear to have had
little success in deriving general standards for the application of the
:' As in the Watson case, the court here does not state on what provision of the
neglect statute its decision is based, a fairly common occurrence in cases of this type.
3 Utah 2d 315, 283 P.2d 887 (1955).
Some extremely fastidious courts refuse to even examine or discuss the facts in
moral neglect cases and say only that they have examined the record and found neglect
to be present.
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neglect concept 2 6 But at least some general standards are available
which are both analytically defensible and amenable to practical
application. The application of these standards may be termed
the "minimum standards test." Parents have a natural right to
bring up their children, which right is a liberty protected by the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.2 7 The basis for state
intervention in the family and state assumption of guardianship
over the children is the parens patriae power.26 The exercise of this
power is grounded on the social need that gave rise to the power,
i.e., the need of helpless children for protection. The ultimate
policy basis supporting the parens patriae power is the state's self-
interest in perpetuating itself by providing responsible future
Gill states:
No more objective or workable concept of neglect has been set by the courts
than that contained in People v. Labrenz .... Neglect, however is the failure
to exercise the care that the circumstances justly demand. It embraces willful
as well as unintentional disregard of duty. It is not a term of fixed and measured
meaning. It takes its context always from specific circumstances and its meaning
varies as the context of surrounding circumstances changes.
Gill, supra note 10 at 6.
Young quotes with approval the American Jurisprudence statement that:
No cut-and-dried rule can be laid down to serve as a yardstick for the determin-
ation of where neglect of a child begins and where it ends, where it harms and
where it does not harm. Each case involving neglected children must be de-
termined on the facts as they were developed.
Young, The Problem of Neglect-The Legal Aspects, 4 J. FAMILY LAW 29 (1964).
" See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, (1923); Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 104, 104-5, 177 P.2d
628, 628-9 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); People ex tel O'Connell v. Turner, 55 111. 280, 284,
8 Am. Rep. 645 (1870); Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 P. 307, 310 (1920);
Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81 (1931); People v. Somma, 127
N.Y.S.2d 169, 173 (Sup. Ct. 1953); State v. Williams, 253 N.C. 337, 117 S.E.2d 444
(1960).
See, e.g., In re Pratt, 219 Mion. 414, 18 N.W.2d 147, 152 (1945); Johnson v.
State, 18 N.J. 422, 426, 114 A.2d 1, 5 (1955); Ex parte Walters, 92 Okla. Crim. 1,
221 P.2d 659, 666-67 (1950); In re Hudson, 13 Wash.2d 293, 126 P.2d 765, 777
(1942).
A few early cases describe juvenile court laws as "administrative police regulation"
perhaps implying an exercise of the police power. See State v. Marmouger, 111 La. 529,
35 So. 529, 533 (1903); Ex parte Januszewski, 196 F. 123, 127 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1911).
However, juvenile court laws grant an unreasonable amount of power to the courts
because, unlike other exercises of the police power, they place no precise limitations on
the power they grant. Thus their justification under the police power is untenable. Note,
Misapplication of the Parens Patriae Power in Delinquency Proceedings, 29 IND. LJ.
475,479 (1954).
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citizens. 29 Accepting this, it is manifest that the power should be
exercised only when children need this protection in order to
develop properly into responsible citizens.
In deciding to invoke this power, by finding that a child is
neglected, the court's sole focus should be whether the child is
being hurt or impaired by his parent's actions and whether he
is likely to be impaired if these actions continue. If the child
is coming to no harm, the state has no right to intervene in the
parent-child relationship through the use of neglect statutes, regard-
less of 'how despicable a character the parent may be outside of
this relationship. To look at parental behavior except as it con-
stitutes a danger to the child is to grossly abuse the parens patriae
power which should look toward the salvation of the child, not the
damnation of the parent.
What effects on the child justify the use of the parens patriae
power? There are two concepts to be examined in answering this
question. First, is the effect on the child one which conflicts with
See Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 458-9, 111 P. 21, 25-6 (1910):
In controversies affecting the custody of an infant, the interest and welfare of
the child is the primary and controlling question by which the court must be
guided. This rule is based upon the theory that the state must perpetuate itself,
and good citizenship is essential to that end. Though nature gives to parents
the right to custody of their own children, and such right is scarcely less sacred
than the right to life and liberty, ... the necessity for government has forced
the recognition of the rule that the perpetuity of the state is the first considera.
tion, and parental authority itself is subject to this supreme power ... But as
government should never interfere with the natural rights of man, except only
when it is essential to the good of society, the state recognizes and enforces,
the right which nature gives to parents to the custody of their own children, and
only supervenes with its sovereign power when the necessities of the case require
it.
See In re Zerick, 74 Ohio L.Abs. 525, 129 N.E.2d 661, 665 (Juv. Ct. 1955):
The state may not abrogate the parents' natural right to the custody and society
of the child except when the interest of society requires it.
Other justifications for state intervention in the family have been presented. "Some
times it is declared that the rearing of children is a function which the state delegates
to parents-..." Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 732, 193 P. 307, 310 (1920). But
"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state," Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 J.S.
510, 535 (1925); this view conflicts with the existence of a constitutionally protected
natural right to custody which has been held to exist in the parents. See itpra note 27.
It has also been suggested that a child, as a citizen, is entitled to protection from
the government and that this right justifies intervention. See ix parte Walters, 92 Okla,
Crim. 1, 221 P.2d 659 (1950). This rationale justifies the enforcement of criminal sta-
tutes against those who direct their criminal actions against children but does not explain
the extra protection the courts give children under the parens patriae doctrine over and
above that to which ordinary citizens are entitled.
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the interest of the state in perpetuating itself? The ansver to this
question can be found by reference to the laws and constitution of
the state which set out the kinds of behavior which the state cannot
tolerate from its citizens and those which it can. Particularly relev-
ant to environmental neglect are those statutes making certain
kinds of immoral behavior felonies and providing for the commit-
ment of psychotics and, on the other side, those constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and religion. Supplementation of
these guidelines can be found in the norms of society where there
is near universal accord that some effects on children are not to be
tolerated in a civilized society. So long as parochialism and sub-
jectivity are avoided, this may well be a good supplementary cri-
terion in determining whether a child is neglected. Second, is the
child helpless against the effect of the parent's behavior? Our legal
system is based upon the theory that man has a free will, and the
parens patriae doctrine postulates the child's helplessness. If other
forces are present in the child's environment which negative the
undesirable effect of the parents' act, then the child does not need
the protection of the state in order to develop into a responsible
citizen and neglect should not be found. In summary, the court
should find neglect only when parental action or condition has or
is likely to have an effect on the child which conflicts with the
self-perpetuating interest of the state and which effect the child is
not likely to overcome without the protection of the state.
The courts in the three cases previously discussed did not apply
the analytic framework just proposed. In the Watson case, three
effects could reasonably be predicted from the mother's actions.
First, the children might be bored for three and a half hours every
evening as a result of attending religious banquets. Second, they
might be unhappy in the communal living establishment, just as
many children are who are sent away to private school. These two
effects are, of course, states of mind, the causes for which the
child-can remove when he reaches his majority by simply removing
himself physically. Third, they might be inculcated with their
mother's religious persuasions. Although this effect is more perman-
ent, it can hardly conflict with the self-perpetuating interest of a
state which has as one of its basic tenents freedom of religion.
Moreover, even the permanence of this effect is arguable as the
children are open to other ideas through their daily attendance
at school and will discover even more competing beliefs as they
grow older and less attached to the home.
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To the extent that the Hunter case is grounded on the court's
belief that the child should be doing something other than distribut-
ing religious literature, it is also open to criticism under a minimum
standards approach. The state may be areligious, but it is certainly
not antireligious and no threat is posed to the state by a child or
an adult doing religious works instead of playing. Moreover, it
is completely repugnant to a minimum standards approach for a
court to dictate to parents the proper occupations of a child.
Courts can properly protect the child from harm but cannot in-
sure that he spend his time in the most socially acceptable and
"beneficial" manner.
The Black case presents a situation where a finding of neglect
is justified under a minimum standards analysis. The facts show
that there was a likelihood that the parents' actions would have
the effect of leading the children to practice polygamy, 0 a felony.
Furthermore, the children probably could not cure the effect
before adulthood, isolated as they were from opposing ideas of
marriage. It is not clear, however, that the court accepted a mini.
mum standards analysis in reaching its decision. The majority chose
to ground the decision on a broad finding of parental immorality,8 1
although probable effects on the children were discussed. More
seriously, the prosecutor was not rebuked for failing to make the
children of the first marriage parties to the action. Certainly there
was a possibility that they too would be affected by the parental
actions, especially as the parents refused to cease teaching that
polygamy was a law of God. The failure to make these children
parties would suggest that the court was more concerned with levy.
ing a punishment to fit the crime on the parents than protecting
all of the children involved.
In these cases we see that the courts usually do not have a
workable theory but only an approach. This approach would often
seem to consist of looking mainly at the parental action or condition
0 The likelihood that the parental teachings would lead to the practice of poly-
gamy by the children was increased because (1) the parents ascribed supernatural origin
to the sanction for these teachings, (2) the teachings were backed by parental example,
and (3) the beliefs of the whole community accorded with the teachings. Additionally,
older siblings of the children involved practiced polygamy, showing that the teachings had
had this effect in the past.
" One justice concurred in the result but hesitated to brand his great grandfather's
polygamous beliefs as immoral; he would have found neglect on the grounds of teaching
children to commit a felony, although unfortunately the statute is not framed In such
obiective terms.
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and finding neglect on the basis of a sense of revulsion or disap-
proval. Another framework exists, however, which does have some
theoretical underpinning-the best interests analysis.
The best interests theory is explicit in a few decisions3 2 and
appears implicit 3 in a great many others. The court using this
theory looks at all of the factors in the case, including the possible
disposition of the child, in deciding whether neglect is present. The
neglect finding is made if, in the opinion of the court, such a
finding would be in the best interests of the child. This approach
is to be contrasted with the standard procedure in a neglect hearing
where the best interest of the child is considered in deciding on
the disposition of the child only after he has been found to be
neglected,34 the neglect finding establishing the court's jurisdiction
over the child. While the best interests test may be an admirable
tool of analysis in deciding the custody of a child in a divorce case
where the court already has jurisdiction over the child and where
both parties have an equal legal right to custody, it is suggested
that the concept is unsuited for making a jurisdictional finding
that neglect exists.
First, this theory is analytically indefensible if our previous
discussion is sound. If a favorable disposition of the child is avail-
able, the best interests test may be used to justify a finding of neglect
even though the effect of the parent's actions on the child is mild,
is not a threat to the state and is curable by the child. For example,
the child might be merely unhappy with an unaffectionate father
and would be happy with an affectionate grandparent who makes
the complaint. It would seem a perversion of the parens patriae
concept to say that the power could be used in a situation like this
' See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 37 Misc. 2d 411, 238 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Faro. Ct. 1962)
(best interests of girls not served by living with mother); In re Duke, 87 Ohio L Abs.
483, 180 N. E. 2d 646 (Juv. Ct. 1961) (where court asks whether children's welfare
will be advanced by leaving them in mother's home); Long v. O'Mary, 270 Ala. 99, 116
So. 2d 563 (1959) (affirming lower court which it says acted in best interests of in-
fant); and State v. Bacon, 249 Iowa 1233, 91 N.W.2d 395 (1959) (major question
said to be what is for the best interest of the child).
' Another standard which deals only with parental action and inaction and which
is more applicable to noneuvironmental neglect is the "tort" test of whether the parent
acted as a reasonable person would under the drcumstances. Like the best interests test,
this gives the court greater power to intervene since it requires only that a parental ac-
tion be somewhat below par. It is advocated by Judge Gill. See Gill, supra note 10 at 6.
" See Gill, supra note 10 at 14. In In re Mfathers, 371 Mich. 516, 124 N.W.2d 878
(1963), it was held patent error to allow proofs before a neglect jury on what disposi-
tion of the child ought to be made. The court also instructed that even where the case
is tried before a judge these two parts should be kept procedurally separate.
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when all of the policy reasons for its existence are absent. Moreover,
the best interests approach of looking at dispositional alternatives
prevents the court from focusing squarely on the parental behavior
and its effect and thus obfuscates the real purpose of the neglect
hearing.
Second, it is often said that the benefit of the child remaining
with his parents is to be considered in deciding what the best
interests of the child are. Yet this test does give less weight to the
parent-child relationship than does the minimum standards test
in that it may operate to remove the child, even though the parent
has not fallen below a prescribed standard of care.85 In so doing,
the best interests approach runs the risk of failing on its own terms
by sadly underestimating a potent force favoring the child's welfare.
It is difficult to see how the court can correctly gauge the beneficial
effect even a "bad" parent-child relationship can have in terms
of the child's sense of identity as part of a biological family unit,
or his relationship with other relatives and membership in a
community. A finding of neglect may destroy all of these relation-
ships as well as the "bad" parent-child relationship, and it would
seem that conservatism would be the better part of valor in taking
so drastic a step.
Finally, the best interests test focuses solely on the interests of
the child and neglects the interests of the parent.8 0 Parents have a
natural right to raise children. To impair that right in the absence
of egregious misbehavior threatens the foundations of a society
which believes that children are not creatures of the state but of the
family.
Having proposed a theory of the neglect concept and criticized
the alternative approaches, other particular classes of environmental
neglect will now be examined in light of the proposed theory.
3 The recent case of Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), shows
the kinds of considerations which can enter into a best interests test decision. In tills
habeas corpus proceeding the court, relying on a child psychologist's testimony relected
at the trial level, held that it was in the best interests of a seven year old boy to give
his custody to grandparents who provided a "stable, dependable, conventional, middle.
class, middlewest background." Id. at 153. The court noted that there was no proof the
father was not a fit or proper person but believed that it was not in the boy's best interest
to expose him to a household which would be "unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian,
and probably intellectually stimulating' Id. at 153. Under the best interests test this
evidence was sufficient to overcome the "presumption of parental preference, which
though weakened in the past several years, exists by statute." Id. at 156.
" See Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CI. L. RiV, 672 (1942).
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II. FAmuis TO DISCIPLINE
The self-perpetuating interest of the state demands that
children not adopt a behavior pattern that will lead to juvenile
or adult criminality. To the extent that lack of parental discipline
may have this effect, the state is justified in interfering in the
parent-child relationship to protect itself. Those states whose neglect
statutes have provisions bearing directly on the problem generally
suggest the need for both a finding that the child's conduct is, or
will be harmful, and a finding that there is a causal link between
the child's behavior and parental failure to discipline properly.
Yet the degree of harm necessary for a finding of neglect is left
vague.3 ' The cases in the area, however, suggest an independent
judicial approach.
This is one of the few areas in the law of neglect in which the
judiciary focuses its attention mainly on the child. In so doing,
however, the courts generally look at the child's actions in a vacuum,
failing to explore whether these actions were caused by some
failure of the parent or by some other influence.38 This restrictive
' Six states declare a child neglected if he is under such improper control as to en-
danger the morals or health or welfare of himself or others (Alabama, Kansas, ha--
land, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee). Wisconsin and Minnesota declare
neglected a child who comes within the section of the statute defining delinquent chil-
dren but whose conduct results at least partially from parental neglect. The New York
statute provides that a child is neglected "who suffers or is likely to suffer serious harm
from the improper guardianship including lack of moral supervision or guidance of his
parents and requires the aid of the court.' Somewhat more vague are the California and
Massachusetts statutes which require that the child be in need of proper and effective
control or be without necessary and proper discipline before the state may intervene.
But see Alaska, Arizona, Washington and Wyoming statutes which do not require
that a likely harmful effect on the child or on society be shown in order to find neglect
on the basis of a lack of proper control by the parent In other states failure to discipline
properly is dealt with under broad provisions such as "lack of proper parental care." See
supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
' In In re Minor, 250 F.2d 419, (D. C. Cir. 1957), the only evidence of inade-
quate parental care was the thefts of the youth. This was sufficient for the court to find
neglect. In State ex rel. Wiley v. Richards, 253 Iowa 679, 113 N.W.d 285 (1962),
evidence showed that eight and twelve year old girls roamed the streets at night and
were addicted to vile language. Although it found the girls neglected, the court stated
there was nothing in the record showing that the mother was not a morally fit person
to care for them. In Nelson v. Clifton, 202 S.W.2d 471 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1947),
neglect was also found, the sole evidence being the destructive vandalism of children
under nine years of age. In Ex parfe Hunter. 45 CaL App. 505, 188 P. 63 (1920), 17
year old girls traveling in automobiles with two Hindu men and attending picture shows
were found neglected as lacking parental controL See also In re Carstairs, 115 N.Y.S.2d
314 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1952), demonstrating that neglect might be found because of a
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focus of attention suggests two tacit assumptions which courts may
be making.39 First, they may be assuming that a neglect finding
really has nothing to do with the parent's actions but is a limited
finding of juvenile delinquency that will not seriously stigmatize
the child. The fact that in all but one case the children either
did nothing definitely illegal or were of tender years would support
this interpretation. Second, the courts may be working under a
theory similar to res ipsa loquitur, considering serious misbehavior
on the part of the child to be proof of lack of proper parental con-
trol. The finding of improper parental control in turn generates
the prediction that the children will act criminally in the future
unless the state intervenes.
Both of these analyses can be criticized. In answer to the
modified juvenile delinquency theory, it need hardly be urged that
the task of broadening the coverage of juvenile delinquency statutes
or decreasing their stigmatizing effect is one properly in the hands
of the legislature, not the courts. This view gains even more cogency
if the state provides separate institutions for the maintenance of the
delinquent and the neglected child when they are removed from
the home.
Serious problems of causality and prediction are ignored in the
application of a res ipsa loquitur theory of neglect. The child's
misbehavior might be caused by lack of parental control, but
it is equally probable that the misbehavior is caused by the child's
neighborhood environment, peer group associations or any number
of other influences. In fact, parental influence may be one of the
few forces promoting moral conduct on the part of the child. Unlike
the tort situation where the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applied,
there can be no isolation of the child from extra-parental influ.
ences, 40 and the court which stops short of an inquiry into the
cause of the misbehavior may do both parent and child a serious
failure to correct misconduct of the child or because of a psychological condition of
which misconduct was a symptom.
" Of course, it may be that the trial court is taking a much less restrictive approach
which shows in the unreported trial record. Still, it cannot be said that the appellate
courts are doing a proper job of instruction if all that is mentioned in their opinion Is
the child's act followed by an affirmance of the neglect finding.
- This is not to say there is no place for the res ipsa loquitur docrtine in the law
of neglect. In In re S. 46 Misc.2d 161, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Family Ct. 1965), it was
held that a prima facie case of neglect was established when a one month old infant
showed the battered child syndrome. Here there was good reason to apply the doctrine
since at this early age an infant is almost completely isolated from extra-parental in-
fluences which could produce the result in question.
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injustice.4 1 Moreover, the question of whether the effect on the
child of the parent's actions is serious enough to call for state
intervention cannot be adequately answered by reference only to
the child's act of misconduct. The seriousness of the act of mis-
conduct the court focuses on is only one measure of how serious
future misconduct will be. The present approach of the courts
may preclude looking at other relevant predictive measures such as
history of misconduct, behavior of other siblings, 42 and objective
tests.43
III. ExcEsswVE DISCIPLINE AND CRUELTY
Twenty-nine states have neglect statutes with provisions deal-
ing specifically with parental cruelty,44 the others relying on broad
provisions such as "lack of proper care." The cases in this area often
' These courts may be acting ultra viresly if the question of causation is not con-
sidered. See Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 482-84, 88 P. 609, 613 (1907), which states:
[AIl the decisions [upholding juvenile legislation] rest upon the proposition
that the state ... has the right ... to substitute itself as guardian... of the
child for that of the parent... and thus to educate and save the child from a
criminal career ... In other words, .. . [the state must] do that which it is
the duty of the father ... to do, -and which the law assumes he will do ...
The duty thus rests upon the father first .... Before the state can be substi-
tuted to the right of parent it must affirmatively be made to appear that the
parent has forfeited his natural .. . right to the custody .. .of the child by
reason of his failure ... or incompetency to discharge the duty.
" It must be noted that in State v. Richards the court mentioned that the girls
had two brothers in the reformatory. This is the kind of fact that deserves emphasis in
an opinion as bearing-on the seriousness of possible future misconduct.
" The Glueck Social Prediction Scale, an easily administered questionnaire which
uses the variables of cohesiveness of family, affection of mother, supervision by mother,
affection of father and discipline by father is said to provide 90% accuracy in predicting
future delinquency. See Ludwig, Delinquent Parents and the Criminal Law, 5 VAND. L
REV. 719, 720 (1952). This claim has been validated. See Thompson, Glueck Soda]
Prediction Scale Validity, 43 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 451 (1953). However, it has come
under some statistical criticism. See Grygier, The Concept of the "Stale of Delinquency"
And Its Consequences for Treatment of Young Offenders, 11 WAYNE L REV. 627, 651
(1965). As long as tests such as this do not have unchallenged predictive validity of a
very high order they should not control the court, however, even at this stage they are
probably a better guide to judicial action than are the folk maxims so frequently applied.
" The differences are mainly semantic: home is unfit by reason of cruelty (Alabama,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, M ichigan, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia); subjected to parental cruelty or
depravity (Oregon); mistreated (Arkansas and Kansas); cruelly treated (Maine); abused
(Idaho); cruelly abused (Delaware); or subjected to mistreatment or abuse (Utah).
The Arizona statute is unique in declaring a child neglected "who is subjected to cruel
and inhuman treatment and shows the effect of being physically mistreated."
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deal with purely physical abuse and therefore do not come under
the heading of environmental neglect. There are some cases, how-
ever, in which stringent discipline or cruelty appear to be grounds
for the neglect finding because of their effect on the child's mental
development.
In In re Carl45 a twelve year old child who lied about playing
hookey was beaten with a broomstick by her father which left black
and blue marks. Although the court found that the father was
unnecessarily assaultive, the opinion did not discuss the physical
extent of the beating but rather the court's theory of child guidance,
which entailed instruction in and use of the "golden rule" as a
viable alternative to corporal correction.
In In re Diaz4" a three and a half month old infant cried
in a doctor's office. In response to the doctor's demand for silence,
the upset mother spanked the child until its buttocks were red and
then she refused to leave. The doctor called the police and the lower
court found the child neglected for "not having proper guardian-
ship." The court apparently proceeded on the theory that the
undeserved spanking of the child showed mental instability in the
mother since the only other evidence supporting the finding was
the mother's failure to submit to a court ordered psychiatric
examination. 47 After eighteen months,48 the trial court was reversed
on the grounds of lack of evidence to support its finding, and
the child was returned.
In In re J. 0. 4 9 the court did not base its decision on the
severity of the discipline which consisted of whipping with hands,
belt or peach stick but on the fact that the whippings were admini-
stered once a week and without cause, according to the child.60
In reaching its decision, the appellate court seemed influenced by
the best interests test, deeming it important that the child was
not happy and ran away from home. The trial court decision was
defended on the ground that the judge was motivated by what he
believed was best for the child.
a 174 Misc. 985, 22 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1940).
212 La. 700, 33 So.2d 201 (1947).
She was unable to afford this examination and submitted a general practitioner's
favorable report instead.
See In re Diaz, 211 La. 1015, 31 So.2d 195 (1947), in which the court held
that the mother was not prevented from appealing by reason of laches.
372 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
Other proven grounds were the failure on one occasion to prepare a proper school
lunch and the fact that the parents quarrelled frequently.
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In the above cases, assuming the child was not seriously harmed
physically, one looks in vain for evidence of irremedial harm to
the child threatening the state's self-perpetuating interest. In none
of the cases is there any discussion of the possibility of the child
being seriously physically or mentally harmed in the future. Rather
it would seem that there existed a difference of opinion between
the court and the parents on the question of how best to discipline
the child or a judicial sentiment that capricious punishment de-
serves censure.51 It is not in the best interests of a child that he be
punished without cause. Yet all parents from time to time may
punish children illogically and in response to pressure outside
the child's behavior. Under a minimum standards theory the task
of the court is to decide when a parent's theory of discipline or lack
of control in disciplining is, such as to threaten the development
of the child into a responsible citizen. This point would certainly
be reached if it appeared that the child were in danger of severe
physical maiming or mental crippling. The better view would be
that this point is not reached simply because the child is unhappy
or the parental discipline fails to conform with that suggested by
Dr. Spock.
In these excessive discipline or cruelty situations, courts fre-
quently make the cruelty by one parent grounds for a finding that
This is not the only area in the law of neglect in which the opinion and senti-
ment of the court may be decisive. How old a child must be before it is no longer
neglectful to leave him alone at night is a very hazy issue in this area. Although this
is a contributory ground for a neglect finding in many cases and the sole ground in a
few, the courts have never set a standard and sometimes do not even mention the age
of the child who is before the court. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 238 Miss. 532, 119 So.
2d 277 (1960); In re Linda, 362 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962).
There is a great variance in subcultural norms dealing with the giving of inde-
pendence and responsibility to children. This variance gives the judiciary the opportunity
to set reasonable standards through its decisions or the option of leaving the decision
to the parenes discretion.
In this area In re ODonnell, 61 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Child. Cr. 1946), shows how
emotional considerations may influence a legal judgment. In that case, a grandmother
and mother were found guilty of neglect for leaving five children alone in an apartment
until 3:00 am. The two oldest children were 11 and 13, ages at which many people in
society believe a child is ready for babysitting responsibility. However, a fire broke out
in the house killing two of the children. With the benefit of hindsight the trial court
sentenced the grandmother to three months in the workhouse for her dereliction. Yet it
would appear that absent the tragedy no more than a stern rebuke would be in order,
if even that. This would appear to be one area in which the legislature could set definite
standards by statute without sacrificing needs for flexibility. Such an action might elim-
inate the kind of ex post facto criminality that the court found here.
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the other parent neglected the child as well, either on the theory
thait the passive parent failed to give the child necessary care and
protection52 or that failure to intercede on the child's behalf is itself
cruelty. 3 This would'appear to prejudice unnecessarily 5l the pas-
sive parent's chances for custody in a later proceeding if the parent
should choose to leave the neglectful spouse.
In this area one also finds acceptance for the proposition that
the parent's cruelty as manifested by abusing one child is sufficient
grounds for taking away another child.55 This would seem a valid
position provided the court examines the total situation in order
to establish the probability that cruelty to one child will lead to a
sufficiently harmful effect on the other. Certainly the acts of cruelty
toward the first child should not be the sole focus of the heating,
although it may be the principal one.
There are two questions that should be asked in this connec-
tion. First, what are the probabilities that the child alleged to be
neglected will be subject to physical abuse as others were? To
answer this the court must explore the duration and severity of the
parental cruelty; the cause for the abuse of the beaten child, if it
was a single occurrence; and, differences between the beaten
child and the allegedly neglected child in their relationship with
the parent (biological and psychological). Second, what are the
probabilities that the parent's actions will cause the allegedly
neglected child to become emotionally disturbed in a serious man-
ner? The type and duration of parental abuse, the age of the child,
his present psychological state and the psychological state of older
siblings who have lived under the same conditions are all relevant
to this question and should be looked into.
See In re J.O., 372 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
See In re Halamuda, 85 Cal. App.2d 219, 192 P.2d 781 (1948) (terminatlon
of parental rights proceeding).
" It is unnecessarily prejudicial because the child can be found neglected on the
basis of only one parent's actions.
In In re Phelps, 145 Mont. 557, 402 P.2d 593 (1965), the court held that evi-
dence that parents severely beat their adopted son of 11 years established their unfitness
to retain custody of their adopted daughter of four years who had not been abused. In
In re O'Beirne, 194 Ore. 389, 241 P.2d 874 (1952), the court went even further.
There it appeared that an adoptive mother had been cruel to her nursery charges and
there was some evidence that her adopted son had been abused (he was bruised). But
the court chose to rest its holding on broader grounds, It said that the charge of main-
tamiing a home which is an unfit place by reason of cruelty comprehends more than
subjecting a child to physical violence. Id. at 392, 241 P.2d 874.
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The O'Beirne court would seem to add a third question: what
are the probabilities that the allegedly neglected child will become
a cruel person because of what he has experienced? This poses a
policy problem. If we do not want a child to grow up to be cruel
(pathological cruelty is of course covered by question two), neither
do we want him to become a liar, shiftless, a breaker of promises or
overly aggressive. Yet parental action can bring about all of these
results without justifying the state's intervention. It would seem
arbitrary at best to condemn action which brings about the first
result and not condemn action which brings about the other results.
IV. PARENTAL IMMORALITY
There is little consensus on the question of what constitutes
moral neglect. The statutes are little guide to the courts because
they are framed in general terms. " As noted earlier, general stand-
ards and theories have not been enunciated. Consequently, decisions
will reflect the value given by individual courts to the parent-child
relationship, the court's tolerance of accepting assumptions about
causality, and whether it views neglect statutes as primarily per-
forming a parent stigmatization function or a society protecting
function. On one end of the theoretical continuum, the court may
decide that parental immorality is grounds for a neglect finding only
if it causes the parent to physically neglect or abuse the child. On
the other end, parental immorality may be considered conclusive
proof of the parent's inability to care properly for the child regard-
less of its effect in the present or future. Courts in the middle of
the spectrum might find neglect if the child is likely to be subject
to immoral temptations, to become an immoral adult, to become
" In addition to the usual catch-all clauses, general moral catch-all clauses are found
in 40 state statutes, and many states have more than one. Under these a child is ne-
glected who is in a situation or environment injurious to his morals (Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Ohio and Pennsylvania); whose home by reason of depravity on
the part of the parent is an unfit place (Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii,
Indiana, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Washington); whose parent is unfit,
by reason of immorality or depravity, to care properly for him (Maryland, South Caro-
lina, and Tennessee); who is without proper moral care (Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, and Wisconsin); whose parents are
immoral or depraved (Connecticut, South Dakota, Texas, and Vermont); who is found
in a disreputable place (Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, and
Oklahoma); or who is found living with vidous, immoral or disreputable people (Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Iowa, Mississippi, New Hamshire,
New Mexico, and Ohio).
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psychologically disturbed or to be socially disadvantaged because
of the parent's action, in that order of seriousness of effect.
Neither the minimum standards test nor any other test of
neglect requires intent to neglect or harm the child on the part
of the parent. Consequently it would not be expected that an affir-
mative act of .immorality by the parent would be a necessary pre-
condition to an adjudication of neglect. The cases demonstrate that
it is not; the fact that the child is living in an immoral environment,
even though it may not be created by the parent, is sufficient to
invoke the court's jurisdiction.5 7
" See In re Williams Welfare, 10 Wash.2d 542, 117 P.2d 202 (1941), in which a
child living with her adoptive mother was declared neglected in a suit instituted by her
natural mother. The court stated that the adoptive mother was adequate in all respects
except that she ran a zooming house which was overcrowded with tenants who drank
and engaged in boisterous conduct.
In In re Snyder, 328 Mich. 277, 43 N.W.2d 849 (1950), a six year old child was
held neglected as being without proper custody or guardianship. One ground of the
holding was that the child was living in an immoral environment as evidenced by the
facts that her guardian was separated from her husband, received welfare, had an older
daughter who had become pregnant while unmarried and that the six year old shared a
bedroom with an adult male boarder.
In Sumner v. Superior Court, 19 Wash.2d 5, 140 P.2d 784 (1943), a 16 year old
girl was found dependent as having no parent able or capable of exercising proper par-
ental control. The girl in question was a school drop out and the mother allowed fre-
quent parties lasting into the night with much drinking and attended by boys in trouble
with the law. But there was no evidence that the girl had ever had more than a couple
of glasses of beer or that mother or daughter had ever committed an immoral act.
Moreover, there was much good reputation evidence presented. The court stated that the
girl's welfare required that she be placed in a different environment.
In all of these cases a standard is used to find neglect which, if applied universally,
would result in plucking all but a handful of children from the slums that pepper our
larger cities. In none of these cases is the child subject to serious present immoral temp-
tation. In none is it likely that the child will become an immoral person unless the
court assumes either that things will get worse or that substantially equivalent condi-
tions will prevail over a prolonged period of time. The fragility of these assumptions
would not justify a finding of neglect under a minimum standards test since the welfare
of the community is not endangered by the situation as it stands. A finding of neglect
would be justified under a best interests test since it is not the best of all possible worlds
for a child to have a permissive parent or to live in a slum, This appears to have been
the standard applied.
There are, however, cases in which an immoral environment alone should be suf-
ficient reason to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Cf. State v. Visser, 249 Iowa 763, 88
N.W.2d 925 (1958) (18 year old son of man living with girls' mother shared bed-
room with the 11 and 16 year old girls and their brother moved into the living room);
Winner v. Brice, 212 N.C. 294, 193 S.E. 400 (1937) (children aged four through ten
are in legal custody of unobjectionable grandparents, but imbecile son is also in home
and home is managed by daughter who lived with a series of men, was convicted of
moral turpitude and is presently a fugitive from the law).
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Although environmental conditions alone may cause a court
to take jurisdiction, in the vast majority of cases there is some
triggering act or series of acts by the parent which leads the court
to examine his fitness and the child's environment. Of these
cases, the majority deal with sexual immorality during marriage
and excessive drinking. But there are two other kinds of parental
action examined by the court and found oprobrious: the com-
mission of a felony and the mothering of an illegitimate child.
There is some conflict about the effect that conviction of a
felony should have in a neglect hearing. The better view under
a minimum standards test is that "it is not one of the punishments
prescribed by law that conviction of a felony works also for for-
feiture of parental rights."58s To hold otherwise would be to force
the court to focus on a single parental act and not on the important
question of the effect of all the parents' actions on the child and
the threat to the state's interest in self-perpetuation posed by this
effect. This is not to say that the parents' criminal record should
not be considered. At times a criminal record may necessitate a
finding of neglect, as when the felony is such as to brand the parent
as unfit (for example, an incest conviction) or when the term
of imprisonment is so long that the children will be deprived of
adequate family life for many years.50 Nevertheless, some statutes
and cases would seem to demand much harsher treatment of the
criminal parent than that proposed.s°
Dierafeld v. People, 137 Colo. 238, 244, 323 P.2d 628, 631 (1958). In this
case the court reversed a lower court ruling and allowed the mother of a one year old
illegitimate child to retain her parental rights until she finished serving her second term
for the felony of forgery, the child being under the care of its grandmother at the time.
See dso Ziemer v. Wheeler, 89 Colo. 242, 1 P.2d 579 (1931) (saying father's viola-
don of prohibition laws would not justify deprivation of custody) (dicta); State v.
Grady, 231 Ore. 65, 371 P.2d 68 (1962) (termination of parental rights not justified
by mother's jail sentence for forgery and parole violation); Froak v. State, 7 Utah 2d
245, 322 P.2d 397 (1958) (custody case) (conviction of forging ration cards not to
be used to bar father from having custody).
' These criteria have been adopted in California. CAi.. CIVIL CODE § 232(d)
(Supp. 1965). See Iz fe Melkonian, 152 Cal. App. 2d 250, 313 P.2d 52 (Cal. 1957);
In re Kapelis, 147 Cal. App. 2d 801, 305 P.2d 968, (Dist. Ct. 1957).
, The South Dakota statute declares neglected any child whose parent or guardian
has been sentenced to imprisonment for crime. In Mchigan, a home may be declared
unfit by reason of criminality on the part of the parent and the child declared neglected.
In Long v. O'Mary, 270 Ala. 99, 116 So. 2d 563 (1959), a one year old adopted
child was declared neglected because he was under improper and insufficient guardianship.
One main ground for the holding was that the adoptive father had more than once
served in the federal penitentiary and had recently been convicted of lottery operations.
It was said that the trial court acted in the best interest of the infant.
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
A few statutes0' and a large number of cases on the subject of
parental immorality deal with the birth to the parent of an illegiti-
mate child. Logically, each illegitimate child is proof of only one
immoral act which occurred more than nine months prior to the
neglect hearing. Mothering an illegitimate child must be viewed as
evidence of parental character and not as an affirmative neglectful
act directed toward the illegitimate child, since there was no child
in being to neglect at the time the immoral act occurred.02 The
courts, however, do not work in so rarified an atmosphere. A psy-
chology of outrage seems to prevail. A look at the cases clarifies
this statement. In four cases having similar fact patterns,08 the courts
held that neglect was not established by showing that the child in
question was illegitimate. In each of these cases the parent gave
birh to only one illegitimate child, and in one the parents were
happily married at the time of the hearing. In another case,04
the mother bore two illegitimate children, but both were by the
same man with whom the mother had broken off relations at the
time of the hearing.0 5
The situation in those cases in which neglect was found were
quite different. In Herman v. McIver 0 the mother had had two
other illegitimate children by different fathers and was then living
with, among others, an illegitimate brother and an illegitimate
The Michigan statute declares a child neglected whose mother Is unmarried and
without adequate provision for care and support. Maryland declares neglected one who
is living in a home which fails to provide a stable moral environment. In deciding this,
the judge is commanded to consider whether the parent is pregnant with an illegitimate
child or has within a period of 12 months either been pregnant with or given birth
to another child to whose putative father she was not legally married at the time of
conception or has not married thereafter. A Kansas statute dealing with termination of
parental rights provides that giving birth to a second illegitimate child is prima fade
proof of unfitness.
But see Raleigh Fithin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anders, 42 N.J. 421,
201 A.2d 537 (1964), declaring an unborn child neglected, in order that a blood trans.
fusion could be administered after birth.
See Inre Shady, 118 N.W.2d 449 (Minn. 1962); In re Larson, 252 Minn. 490,
91 N.W.2d 448 (1958); In re Hock, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 73, 88 N.E.2d 597 (Ct. App.
1947); State ex rel Mattes v. Juvenile Court, 147 Minn. 222, 179 N.W. 1006 (1920).
"In re Kronjaeger, 166 Ohio St. 172, 140 N.E.2d 773 (1957).
" But see the amazing result in State ex rel Smith v. Superior Court, 23 Wash,2d
357, 161 P.2d 188 (1945). In this case the court declared two children, aged three
and five, dependent because their father lived with the deceased mother for six years
without marrying her. Both parents were afraid that the neighbors would learn of the
marriage and know they had been living in sin for years.
66 N.M. 36, 341 P.2d 457 (1959).
(Vol, 2 9
CHILD NEGLECT
niece or nephew. In In re Three Minors7 three illegitimate children
by two different men were involved and the mother was living
entirely on public assistance. In In re Duke"s the twenty-five year
old mother had had four illegitimate children and received public
assistance.69
Illegitimate children present a situation of highly visible im-
morality. Unlike an immoral incident, they cannot be hidden from
the public eye and quickly forgotten. Consequently, it is here more
than anywhere that we see the court making moral judgments
focused on the parent and not on the effect" on the child, com-
plete with credits for staying with the same man and only "stray-
ing" once and demerits for taking the public monies and not
learning one's lesson. This is not to minimize the point that a
succession of illegitimate children speaks ill for a future life of
morality. But if the court were really concerned with the effect of
the parent's act on the child, one would expect to see much more
consideration of the age of the child and the present home environ-
ment in the decisions. Illegitimacy is on the increase, 71 and the
issue of whether it is grounds for a finding of neglect will have
to be faced more and more frequently. Hopefully it will not be
dealt -with by courts whose decisions could be interpreted as vehicles
for legislating against Aid to Dependent Children programs and
punishing the parents of illegitimate children.
By far the greatest number of cases dealing with parental im-
morality are concerned with drinking and sexual promiscuity which
50 Wash.2d 653, 314 P.2d 423 (1957).
43 87 Ohio L.Abs. 483, 180 N.E.2d 646 (Juv. Ct 1961).
See aso In re Shultz, 99 Cal. App. 134, 277 P. 1049 (Dist. Ct. 1929) (illegiti-
macy plus questionable associations); In re Marsh, 344 S.W.2d 251 (Tx. Ct. Civ. App.
1961) (illegitimacy plus mother's incestuous relationship with her stepfather).
" In Long v. OMary, 270 Ala. 99, 116 So.2d 563 (1959), the court appears to
focus on the effect, but certainly not on a valid minimum standards effect One ground
of the neglect holding was that if the child were allowed to stay with his foster parents,
he would be brought up in a community in which facts concerning his illegitimate birth
were known. If the possibility of future feelings of shame is suffident justification for a
finding of neglect, it is difficult to imagine what effect would be too insubstantial for
such a finding.
' Between 1938 and 1958 births out of wedlock increased from less than 100,000
to more than 200,000. Herzug, Unmarried Mothers and Some Questions to Be Answered
and Some Answers to be Questioned, 41 CHILD WELFARE 339.49 (1962).
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occurs 'after the birth of the children.72 Many of these cases present
clear cut situations where the parent's actions endanger the child
or result in physical negiect.73 Others, however, present situations
where if any harm is occurring to the child it is acting upon his mind
and character, not his body. In this latter group of cases we again
see the court centering its attention upon the relative moral
repugnance of the parent's act. Perhaps most indicative of this
concentration on the parental act to the exclusion of an examination
of the effect on the child is the absence of a discussion of factors
bearing on the effect. The age of the child is usually not discussed
in the opinion and occasionally not even mentioned.7 4 Frequently
infants who could scarcely be aware of the implications of their
parent's conduct are declared neglected.7 5 Very rarely discussed
are factors which might mitigate the effect of the parental immor-
ality. For example, parental church going, the guidance of other
relatives and the good offices of friends of the family and of the
child are apparently given little attention. But one exception to this
attitude -may be noted. Some courts are more likely to declare a
child neglected if the immorality takes place in the home rather
than surreptitiously36 Open immorality is more likely to influence
the child than immorality he does not know of, but the courts'
taking notice of this may often be explained by the fact that
open immorality is more morally repugnant in our society than
72 In a study of neglect referrals in the Minneapolls-St. Paul area over a two month
period Boehm found that the problems most frequently cited in neglect complaints In
order of frequency were: excessive drinking, inadequate housekeeping, illicit sex rela.
dons of parents and leaving children unattended. Usually these problems were found in
dusters, each occurring in more than one-third of the complaints. Boehm, The Corn.
munity and the Social Agency Define Neglect, 43 CHILD WELFARE 453, 460 (1964).
" See, e.g., In re Corrigan, 134 Cal. App.2d 286 P.2d 32 (1955); State v. Farrell,
241 Mo.App. 234, 237 S.W.2d 493 (1951); In re Van Vlack, 81 Cal. App.2d 838,
185 P.2d 436 (1947); Rogers v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 355, 11 SE.2d 584 (1940),
' See McNatt v. State, 330 P.2d 600 (Old. 1958).
" See, e.g., In re Holt, 121 Cal. App.2d 276, 263 P.2d 50 (1953) (two years
old); Winner v. Brice, 212 N.C. 294, 193 S.E. 400 (1937) (youngest was four); In re
Decker, 28 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 433 (Juv. Ct. 1930) (one year old).
" When immorality takes place in the vicinity of the child, neglect is always found.
See, e.g., Watson v. Department of Public Welfare, 130 Ind. App. 659, 165 NI.2d
770 (1960); In re Anonymous, 37 Misc. 2d 411, 238 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Pai. Ct, 1962);
McNatt v. State, 330 P.2d 600 (Okl. 1958). But decisions go both ways when the Ir-
morality takes place outside the home. No neglect was found in In re Knight, 212 La,
357, 31 So.2d 825 (1947) and In re Rinker, 180 Pa. Super. 204, 117 A2d 780
(1955). Neglect was found in In re M-L-J-, 356 S.W.2d 508 (Mo.Ct. App. 1962)
and In re Decker, 28 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 433 (Juv. Ct. 1930).
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covert immorality and hence provides an additional reason to
"punish" the parent.
Finally, the courts do not grapple seriously with the question
of whether the effect on the child of the parent's immorality
is sufficiently serious to justify state intervention. In the final
analysis neglect is a question of the normative pattern of society:
yesterday's stem school master is today's child abuser, yesterday's
parental hater of idleness is today's Fagin. To aggravate the prob-
lem, codified law in this area is often one or more generations out
of step with the general beliefs of society, a condition which is re-
flected in the enforcement of penal laws directed against sexual
immorality and which should be reflected in the law of neglect.
No better advice to the courts can be found than that given in
1894:
There is such a diversity of religious and social opinion, and
of social standing and of intellectual and of moral responsibil-
ity, in society at large, that courts must exercise great charity
and forebearance for the opinions, methods, and practices of all
different classes of society; and a case should be made out which
is sufficiently extravagant and singular and wrong to meet the
condemnation of all decent and law-abiding people, without
regard to religious belief or social standing, before a parent
should be deprived of the comfort or custody of a child.""
This is not to say that penal laws dealing with immorality
are not to be considered in deciding what effect on the child
threatens the self-perpetuating interest of the state. In making this
decision the court should take judicial cognizance of patterns of
enforcement of these laws and of the standards of morality to which
society adheres."8 Certainly under this approach a child would not
be declared neglected if the effect of his parent's actions were
such as to lead him to act as the majority of his peer group acts, as
for example, engaging in premarital intercourse in the later teen-
age years. On the other hand, the likely effect of leading a child
Lovel v. House of the Good Shepherd, 9 Wash. 419, 422, 37 P. 660, 662 (1894).
It might be argued that this approach constitutes a judicial abdication of moral
responsibility for the community, but consider the alternative. When a court declares
neglected children whose parents are "guilty of conduct unbecoming parents trying to
raise children according to the Christian standard," In re Decker, 28 Ohio N.P. (NS.)
433, 435 (Juv. Ct. 1930), or promises that it "will never succumb to the 'Hollywood'
type of morality so popular today," In re Anonymous, 37 Misc. 2d 411, 412, 238
N.Y.2d 422, 423 (Family Ct. 1962), it sets itself an impossible task in light of avail.
able judicial and sodal resources. If nothing else, Prohibition should have shown the
futility of trying to enforce standards of morality which are not generally accepted.
1968] -.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [
to experiment with sex at an early age, to engage in prostitution
or to engage in sexual practices our society defines as unnatural
would justify a neglect finding. Needless to say, the less repugnant
the effect on the child, the greater the proof of likelihood of effect
the court should demand.
V. MENTALLY DISTURBED OR DISTURBING PARENTAL CONDUCT
While eleven states have specific statutory provisions requiring
parents to give help to a mentally disturbed or defective child,10
only six have specific provisions which might be construed so as
to lay on the parents the burden of protecting the mental health
of the child.80 Idaho has the most ambitious statute in this area.
Apparently trying to incorporate into the statute a psychologist's
definition of an incipient autistic, the 1963 Child Protective Act
defines emotional maladjustment as "The condition of a child who
has been denied proper parental love or adequate affectionate
parental association, and who behaves unnaturally and unrealisti-
cally in relation to normal situations, objects and other persons."
The juvenile court is then given jurisdiction over a child whose
"behavior indicates social or emotional maladjustment." This ap.
proach would seem doubly promising in that it attempts to reach
the child with psychological problems before the state of tragedy
is reached and it simultaneously offers sound and specific guidance
to prevent judicial overreaching. The paucity of similar statutes
cannot be explained by looking at the prevalence of the psychologi-
cal neglect problem in society, nor by looking at the threat to
" In most jurisdictions, a child is declared neglected "whose parent neglects or
refuses to provide special care made necessary by its mental condition." (Arizona, District
of Columbia, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.)
The Mississippi Statute expressly provides that the mental condition may be either "ment-
ally defective or mentally disturbed." In Florida and Georgia a child is neglected "who
is, neglected as to... psychiatric, psychological or other care necessary for his well being."
While there are no published cases in this area, there would seem to be no reason
for the courts to depart from the balancing test used in applying medical neglect statutes.
In those cases, the court balances the danger to the child's health (here mental health)
against the parents' natural right to the child and the danger the child will face as a
result of the court's order. See State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
" Three statutes denote mental incapacity as one reason why a parent may be un.
fit to care properly for a child. (Maryland, South Carolina and Tennessee.) Minnesota
provides both that a child is neglected "who is without proper parental care because
of the emotional, mental or physical disability or state of immaturity of the parent" and
also that one is neglected who "is without. . .care necessary for his . mental health
. . . because his parent . ., neglects or refuses to provide it." The Connecticut statute
dedares neglected one "who is denied proper care and attention ... mentally .... .
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society entailed in the existence of thousands of mentally disturbed
and unproductive children and adults. It may, however, be a re-
sponse to the problem of deciding what kinds of parental action
are productive of this sad result, a predictive problem which
finds reflection in the cases. These cases fall into two main cate-
gories: those in which the parent's mental condition in itself justi-
fies a finding of neglect and those in which the parent's actions ane
such as to endanger the child's mental health.
In the first group of cases we can define some hazy bound-
aries. A child will be declared neglected if the parent is an insti-
tutionalized psychotic, 1 but he will not be so declared if the only
evidence of mental disturbance in the parent is a layman's opinion
combined with some slight circumstancial affirmation.8 2 One of the
few cases in the reports that falls between these two poles shows
the creative use a perceptive court can make of neglect statutes.83
In this case both parent and child were examined by psychiatrists.
The court discussed the mother's mental condition (severe emo-
tional disturbance diagnosed as psychoneurosis with conversion
hysteria), the son's mental condition (inability to hold his own with
other children), the mother's reaction to the son (ranging from
oversolicitude to hostility) and the son's reaction to the mother
(an obsession with health and medical matters because of the
mother's constant dwelling on them). Examples were given of these
reactions so that the discussion was not purely theoretical. The
child was found neglected under the statutory provisions dealing
with lack of proper parental control, California having no specific
mental health provisions. When, as here, the mentally disturbed
parent is not ill enough to justify commitment at the time of the
hearing, it would seem incumbent upon the court to examine the
effect of the parent's illness on the child both in terms of serious-
ness and directness of relationship before making the finding of
See In fe Dehart, 114 So.2d 13 (Dis.Ct.Fla. 1959) (parents mental health so
dissipated through use of alcohol and drugs that she was declared mentally incompetent
and forcibly committed).
' See Sutter v. Yutz, 223 S.W.2d 554 (Ct. of Civ. App. Texas 1949). in which
the following evidence was held insufcient to deprive mother of custody on ground
that she was mentally ill: (1) layman's opinion that she was mentally ill; (2) the
fact that she suffered from shingles, a nervous disease; (3) the occurrence of an un-
fortunate love affair after divorce; and (4) the fact that she tied child to bed while
she went downtown.
" People ex rel Furley v. Furley, 162 Cal. App. 2d 474, 328 P.2d 230 (1958).
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
neglect.8 4 The sole focus should not be the seriousness of the
parental disorder, a proposition which this court seemed to accept
and act on.85
In the second group of cases a neglect finding is sought on the
ground that the parent's actions are such as to endanger the child's
mental health. The most frequent fact situation involves quarrelling
parents,80 although subjecting a child to a sense of rejection 8l
" In re Smart, 114 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1940), presented a case where the
parent's illness had a direct effect on the child but not an effect serious enough to justify
a finding of neglect. The evidence was that the divorced mother, given her financial
means, had taken good care of her teenage daughter and provided an excellent educa.
tion for her. The argument was made that the mother was mentally incompetent to
provide adequate parental care. Supporting this argument was the fact that the mother
believed her divorced husband had shown sexual interest in the girl when she was less
than a year old because of the sound of the child's screams heard from another room;
also, there was testimony of lay witnesses that the mother was distraught and that the
mother believed the father exercised hypnotic influence through thought transference
whenever he wag in the child's vicinity. The effect on the child of the mother's neurotic
beliefs was that she hated the father whom she had never seen and believed in his hyp-
notic influence. The court held there was no neglect as neither the welfare of the child
nor the best interests of the state were threatened. A minimum standards theory would
lead to the same result. Here we have an effect on the child which may be irremediable,
But the effect is not one which would prevent the child from becoming a useful and
productive member of society. In addition, if long association with the mother has
produced only this effect it is unlikely that a more serious effect would develop in the
future, e.g., a hatred of all males, a persecution complex. The court cannot declare
neglected all children who hate their fathers and should not do so merely because tie
hatred has a pathological foundation unless this pathological foundation will lead to
more socially threatening effects.
"' A corollary problem with this class of case inheres in the fact that the court
often asks the parent to be tested by a psychiatrist to determine mental stability and
intelligence. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 142 So. 2d 740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. (1962); In 're
Work, 119 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1952); Cardenas v. Rogers, 15 Cal. Reptr. 238 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1961). The psychiatrist's opinion on parental fitness is often accepted without
enunciating either the psychological basis for this opinlon or the legal basis for the
court's acceptance of it.
" See, e.g., In re Dubin, 112 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Dom.Rel.Ct. 1952), in which two
separated parents lied about each other to the children and argued about the mother's
alleged membership in the Communist Party. People v. Phipps, 97 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Doni,
Rel. Ct. 1950), in which the father repeatedly asked the young child who the mother
was sleeping with and who her boyfriend was. Kennedy v. State Dept. of Pensions and
Security, 277 Ala. 5, 166 So.2d 736 (1964), in which the parents engaged in violent
arguments in, front of the children based on petty and insignificant causes which some.
times reached the point of physical violence.
I See In re Schwartz, 35 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942), where a finding
of neglect was premised in part on a finding that the child was resented and made to
feel that she was unwanted and an unfair burden on the family purse.
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or insecurity8 8 have also been used as a basis for a neglect finding.
In none of these cases does it appear that the court has a plofessional
report on the mental health of the children.8 9 In none does the
court cite any psychology treatise for the proposition that the par-
ental action involved will probably lead to mental disturba:nce
on the part of the children. In all cases the court appears to rely
on common sense notions or upon cursory examination of the
children to establish the harmful effect of the parental action.
Furthermore, in many of the cases the harmful effect referred to
appears to mean any deleterious effect. It is impossible to argue
with the contention that children will suffer more deleterious
effects having parents who quarrel than those who have optimally
compatible parents. This approach, however, focuses on the wrong
question. The court is not to decide which of two courses of parental
action is best but to decide whether a course of action is sufficiently
harmful to justify the stern sanction of a neglect finding.
Using a minimum standards analysis, mentally disturbing
parental action would be harmful enough to justify a finding
of negelct if there were a probability that such continued behavior
would lead to the child's having a severe mental disturbance, i.e.,
pyschosis or severe and debilitating neurosis. This effect is certainly
as threatening to a society which wants responsible and productive
citizens as-is the prospect of a child coming into adulthood maimed
"See State v. Bacon, 429 Iowa 1233, 91 N.W.2d 395 (1958), where the court
admitted that a seven year old boy had food, clothing, shelcer, love and affection. Yet
the court found him negletted and took custody from the person who had been his
guardian since the age of three weeks because of an older child's possible unfavorable
influence and because of the insecurity a proposed move might have generated, saying,
-this nomadic existence must surely be harmful to a small child." See also In re Roe,
196 vfisc. 830, 831, 92 N.Y.S2d 882, 884 (Dom. ReLCt. 1949).
It is my opinion, and I find it to be the law, that to subject a child to a sense
of insecurity, either by way of rejection or ill treatment or by precept, which
will result in the development in children of agressive tendencies and delinquent
conduct, is neglect of a child and neglect of a very serious nature. Children are
entitled to guidance, advice, counsel and affection, understanding and sympathy,
and when these are not accorded them, either because of inability to love or
understand and sympathize, or by reason of whipping them, that would consti.
tute serious and severe neglect of the children.
' This is more likely to be the fault of the legislature than of the courts. In a
recent poll of over 1,500 juvenile court judges, 83% reported they did not have the
help of any psychologists or psychiatrists. McCune & Skeler, Juvenile Court Judger in
the United States, Part I, A National Profile, 11 CRIM & DELINQUENCY 121, 128
(1965). Given this statistic, it is no wonder that folk maxims rather than science are
applied by the courts in determining the effect of parental behavior on the child.
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or in serious and permanent bad health. There is no more cause
to find childern neglected who are made unhappy by their parents
mentally disturbing conduct than to find children neglected who are
made unhappy by their parent's impoverished but subsistence level
economic condition.
The major problem in this area is determining what parental
action will in fact lead to serious mental disturbance in the
children. One answer is to require that the child involved be
examined by a psychiatrist in order to discover possible symptoms
pointing toward later mental disturbance. Another is for the court
to have older siblings who have been subjected to the same "labora-
tory conditions" examined in order to find what the result of the
parental actions has been in the past. A third answer is found in a
recent Arizona decision which, however debatable its result, blazes
a new and possibly rewarding trail.
Caruso v. Superior Court90 involved a petition for a writ of
prohibition on a dependency charge lodged against the putative
father of an illegitimate infant. If awarded custody he planned to
leave the child with a babysitter while he worked. In refusing the
writ, the court held that the body of knowledge on infant care is
sufficiently well established that a court can take judicial notice
of the fact that there are emotional needs of infants which if not
satisfied may lead to permanent damage. One of these needs is to be
cared for by someone who loves it. The court suggests that a cri-
terion for a judicial notice of findings in the behavioral sciences be
found in a major encyclopedia."' The court notes that by taking
notice of these findings the courts will have power to deal with the
causes of emotional disturbance and delinquency, and not simply
the results. A widespread acceptance of the view that judicial
notice should be taken of the findings of social scientists would
give the courts a beneficial and much needed supplement to
"common sense" and folk theory in deciding cases of this sort. Also,
it would have the effect of focusing judicial attention on the effects
of the parental actions, not on the actions themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
Neglect law, particularly the law of environmental neglect, if
haphazardly applied represents a threat to some of our most closely
2 Ariz. App. 134, 406 P.2d 852 (1965).
'* A less enthusiastic but more valid criteria would be a finding that a large ma-
jority of the accepted authorities in the field agree with a proposition and that It Is
supported by empirical studies.
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held values. A temptation to use it loosely exists since it is one of
the few areas of the law in which the court can enforce its own
moral values and theories of child rearing with very serious sanc-
tions, and these are two areas in which everyone usually has strong
opinions. This temptation can be curbed by both the legislature
and the judiciary if strong positive actions are taken.
The legislature, although it must give the trial court flexibility,
can mold the approach taken by the judiciary by drafting statutes
which define neglect in terms of the effect on the child - and by
emphasizing the seriousness of the effect which must be found in
order to justify such stern sanctions. In the final analysis, however,
the success or failure of neglect law lies with the court. Their suc-
cess can best be insured by submerging subjective values, by closely
studying causal interpretations put forth, and above all by using
the full power of the decisional process to develop sound approaches
and theories that will meet the needs of society without sacrificing
the values of society.
